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ENGAGING WITH THE SELF:  
MIRROR BEHAVIOUR IN AUTISM, DOWN SYNDROME AND TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Abstract 
  
 
Children with autism achieve mirror self-recognition appropriate to developmental age, but are 
nonetheless reported to have problems in other aspects of a sense of self. We observed behaviour in 
the mirror in 12 pre-school children with autism, 13 pre-school children with Down syndrome and 13 
typically developing toddlers.  Reliable differences in reflecting actions, social relatedness and 
positive affect towards themselves, and an absence of coy smiles differentiated the children with 
Autism from the others. The children with Down syndrome showed the highest interest in their own 
faces. These differences were largely independent of mirror self-recognition, supporting arguments 
for a dissociation between interpersonal and conceptual aspects of self. Mirror behaviour may be a 
subtle but easily elicited measure of problems in the sense of self. 
                                                                                          ENGAGING WITH THE SELF 3 
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MIRROR BEHAVIOUR IN AUTISM, DOWN SYNDROME AND TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In developmental psychology the mirror has become synonymous with the identification of the 
self, mirrors being used to identify children’s recognition of the visual self (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 
1979), of space in relation to the self (Mitchell, 1992), and the likelihood of self-conscious affective 
behaviour (Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss, 1989). But mirrors can also 
symbolise and allow a relation with, the Other. They can reflect the self back as the Self,  as an 
Other, or as seen by an Other (Kernberg, 2006)or, indeed, as just another reflection. How one reacts 
to the self in a mirror allows us to study the extent to which the self is perceived and presented as a 
social being.  
Self and other have been seen as mutually constitutive (Maclaren, 2008) with problems in the 
development of one necessarily reflected in problems in the other (Hobson, 1990).These arguments 
are strengthened by neurophysiological findings that common brain areas are involved in perceiving 
the actions of (Gallese, 2001) and processing information about, self and other (Iacoboni, 2006). 
However, there is an apparent dissociation between the two in disorders such as autism. Children 
with autism pass the mirror self recognition test (MSR) - a respected measure of a concept of self 
(Gallup, 1970; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss, 1989) - at a developmental age-appropriate level 
(Neuman & Hill, 1978; Dawson & McKissick, 1984; Spiker & Ricks, 1984; Ferrari & Matthews 
1983). However, they show serious problems in their ability to relate to others (Dawson & Adams, 
1984; Lord, 1993; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer & Sherman, 1986; Hobson, 1990; 1993). They also 
show serious problems in other aspects of the self: in the awareness of pain and discomfort (Wing, 
1996; although see Nader, Oberlander, Chambers & Craig, 2004), in responses to self as a person 
rather than as an object (Ritvo et al., 1971), in problems with showing self-conscious affects 
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(Neuman & Hill, 1978; Dawson & McKissick, 1984; Kasari, Sigman, Baumgartner, & Stipek, 1993; 
Bauminger, 2004; Hobson, Chidambi, Lee & Meyer, 2006).  
What does this dissociation mean? Criticisms of the MSR relate not only to its adequacy as a 
stable indication of visual self-recognition (Loveland, 1984, 1993; Mitchell, 1993, 1997; Suddendorf, 
1999) but more importantly, to the narrowness of visual self-recognition as a measure of a sense of 
self (e.g., Neisser, 1988, Loveland, 1993).  Loveland suggests that we cannot conclude from age-
appropriate success in MSR that children with autism have no problem with a sense of self. Rather, 
she argues, it is more likely that MSR only presupposes and demonstrates what Neisser (1993) calls 
an ‘ecological self’, i.e., the ‘self-who-is-located-here’ (Loveland, 1993) rather than an ‘interpersonal 
self’, i.e., the self-who-exists-in-relation-to-persons (including to the self as a person). The 
dissociation, therefore, may exist between different aspects of self: between self perceived or 
conceived as a body in space, and self perceived or conceived as a psychological or social entity.  
Brief suggestive evidence to support this interpretation comes from two studies on MSR in 
autism. Neuman & Hill (1978) tested seven 5 to 11 year-olds with autism who showed similar 
proportions of interest in their mirror images to control infants, a variety of movements ‘to see if the 
image responded’ but no embarrassed or self-conscious reactions. Dawson & McKissick (1984) 
compared fifteen 4 to 6 year-olds with autism with typically developing infants from a previous 
study (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) and found that lower percentages of children with autism 
vocalised to their own images,  or directed behaviour to the mirror rather than to their own faces and 
none showed any ‘coy or silly behaviour’. However, from these studies we do not know at what 
targets children with autism do choose to look in the mirror, the proportion of different actions that 
they perform to themselves, or how the distribution of these preferences might overlap with those of 
children who are matched in terms of developmental delay and chronological age.    
The mirror also puts the onus entirely on the viewer for initiating interaction. The ability to 
initiate is  key to establishing joint attention (Nichols, Fox & Mundy, 2005) and possibly also mutual 
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attention (Reddy, 2003). Problems in autism with the initiation of declarative attentional 
engagements (Mundy et al 1986, 1994; Dawson, Toth, Abbott, Osterling & Munson, 2004) as well as 
with automatic mimicry of facial expressions (McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & 
Wilbarger, 2006) may sharpen the difficulty in engaging with the self. We would expect, in sum, that 
children with autism would show profound disturbances in social relatedness to the self in mirrors. 
In the present exploratory study we compare social behaviour in mirrors and its relation to 
MSR in three groups of children: preschool children with autism, preschool children with Down 
syndrome (DS) and typically developing toddlers (TD).  Children with DS also show developmental 
delay and developmental age-appropriate abilities in MSR (Mans, Cicchetti & Sroufe, 1978), reliable 
interest in the mirror (more than typically developing infants, Loveland, 1987), but unlike children 
with autism, no problems with the development of an interpersonal self. In TD toddlers the middle of 
the second year differentiates passers and failers on the MSR, and may be a critical time for 
investigating shifts in interest in the self (Nielsen et al 2003) and shifts in affect towards the self 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Amsterdam & Greenberg, 1977; see also Dixon, 1957) and thus provides 
opportunities for exploring, across the three groups, the relationship between MSR and social 
behaviour to the self. We explore three aspects of mirror behaviour: interest in looking at self rather 
than at other things, interest in relating socially with the self rather than testing reflections or just 
watching, and positive affect towards the self in the mirror.  
 
Method 
Participants and recruitment 
The analyses of mirror behaviour in this study were conducted on a sample of 12 children with 
autism, 13 children with DS and 13 TD toddlers, all of whom were part of two larger studies of TD 
infants and pre-school children with autism and with DS. Parents of the children with autism were 
contacted through professional diagnostic clinics and organisations associated with the National 
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Autistic Society and through independent playgroups for children with special needs. Each child in 
the autism group had received a previous clinical diagnosis of autism from different clinicians in the 
National Health Service.  These children were diagnosed at one of two different diagnostic centres in 
the south of England. In the absence of confirmatory diagnostic assessments, semi-structured 
interviews with parents and home observations were conducted to support previous clinical 
diagnoses.  The parents of the children with DS were contacted with the help of the Portsmouth 
Down syndrome Trust and through independent playgroups and nursery schools. TD infants were 
recruited through GP surgeries. All families in the present study were white Caucasian, culturally 
British and of middle or low SES. None of the children in the three groups had any visual or motor 
impairments that could interfere with an ability to look in the mirror or demonstrate self-recognition 
through face-touching.  
 
Matching and Demographic details 
Table 1a shows the characteristics of the children in the three groups. The two groups of 
preschool children were matched on chronological age (CA) and Developmental Age using the 
Mental Development Index of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID-II) which combines 
both cognitive and language items and on Language Production (including signs) using the 
MacArthur Communicative Development Index (CDI).  The TD toddlers were selected from the 
larger longitudinal study when they were given the mirror sessions: eleven were filmed at 17 months 
and two at 24 months. They were significantly different from both the other groups in CA but not in 
Developmental Age or Language Production (see Table 1a). Table 1b shows characteristics of MSR 
Recognisers and Non-Recognisers in each group: Developmental Age differentiated them in the 
Autism and DS groups, and CA in the Autism group; Language Production did not differentiate them 
in any group.  
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Table 1a. Characteristics of participants: Mean (SD) {Min-Max} 
 Autism  DS  TD 
N (boys, girls) 12 (10, 2) 13 (8,5)  13 (5, 8) 
CA (months) ***  47.92 (6.6){36-56} 42.77 (7.7){31-56} 18.46 (2.73){17-25} 
DevAge (BSID-II) 15.83(4.17){11-26} 18.46 (4.41){9-25} 18.69 (2.75) {15-25} 
LangProduction (CDI) 14.48 (7.1) {8-28} 18.89 (4.39) {13-26} 16.61 (3.36) {13-23} 
 
 
 
Table 1b. Characteristics of MSR Recognisers and Non-Recognisers: Mean (SD) {Min-Max} 
 Autism   DS  TD  
 Recognisers Non-
Recognisers
  
Recognisers Non-
Recognisers
  
Recognisers Non-
Recognisers
 
  
N (boys, girls)
  
8 (7,1)  4 (3,1)  10 (7,3)   8 (4,4)  5(1,4) 
CA (months)
  
51.5 (3.55)*
  
40.75 (5.25) 44.8 (7.33) 36.0 (5.0) 19.25 (3.28) 17.2 (.45) 
DevAge 
(BSID-II) 
17.5 (4.07)*
  
12.5 (1.73) 20.0 (3.37)* 13.33 (3.79) 19.38 (3.34) 17.6 (.89) 
LangProduction 
(CDI)  
15.44 (8.67) 12.58 (1.41) 19.70 (4.11) 16.2 (5.03) 16.95 (3.91) 16.06 (2.56) 
 
 
Procedure 
Two visits about two weeks apart were made to the home of each child, during which psychometric 
tests (the BSID-II and the MacArthur CDI) were administered and a Mirror Session filmed. At a 
suitable time during the home visit when the child’s mood was pleasant a wall mirror with a light 
plastic frame, oval-shaped, 24 inches by 15 inches, was placed against a suitable wall or piece of 
furniture and the child was invited to attend to it. The arrival of the mirror was often sufficient and no 
more than a “Look” was required to draw the children to it. After about two minutes of free 
interaction time with the mirror (ensuring that the children did look at themselves at least twice for at 
least three seconds duration), the parent (previously primed to the task) called the child away 
ostensibly in order to wipe their noses and placed a sticky-backed red dot on the front of the face. The 
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location of the dot on the face varied but did not appear to influence test success: In the Autism and 
DS groups fourteen parents placed the dot on the cheek (nine passed the test) and eleven on the 
forehead (eight passed the test). In the TD group nine parents placed the dot on the nose (four passed 
the test) and four on the cheek (all passed the test). In all cases the children were observed before 
return to the mirror to ensure that they had not detected the dot, and were then allowed back to the 
mirror for another two minutes.  
 
Coding   From the mirror session prior to the MSR test we extracted for each child from 30 seconds to 
a maximum of 60 seconds of attention to specific targets in the mirror, excluding segments where the 
camera angle prevented accurate coding as well as segments where the child was not looking in the 
mirror. The primary coder was blind to the hypotheses of the study. Coding started with the 
identification of bouts of attention by first playing the tape at normal speed and then moving it frame 
by frame to fix start and end times from a timer strip superimposed on the videotape (in milliseconds). 
Bouts began with gaze in the mirror to any target, and ended when gaze shifted to a different target or 
away from the mirror. Following a period of training, reliability of coding was determined by the 
primary coder and first author separately coding mirror sessions for 10 children, amounting to about 
25% of the data. The two coders agreed on the identification of 87% of bouts of attention in the 
mirror; 8% of those identified by the first author were identified as more than one bout and 5% 
omitted by the primary coder. The reliability of further codes was conducted only on the agreed bouts 
(see Table 2 for details). 
    
Coding the Mirror Self-Recognition Test 
 The MSR test was coded according to standard criteria, on the basis of either clear dot or face 
directed movements of the hands or specific verbal reference to the dot upon seeing the dot in the 
mirror. Simply looking more at the face was not taken as evidence of self-recognition. The first 
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author and a coder blind to the hypotheses of the study coded all children on the test independently. 
Cases of uncertainty were discussed and 100% agreement reached. 
 
Table 2. Coding of bouts of attention in the mirror 
 
Targets of 
Attention  
kappa  = .86 
Own face: Child’s gaze focused on their own face.  
Other’s face: Child’s gaze focused on another person’s face in the mirror (usually 
mother, father or sibling).  
Things: Child’s gaze directed to objects (e.g., held in the hand), the room (including 
the ceiling, furniture or the general background), body parts not including a view of 
the face (including gaze to specific body parts of other persons). 
Camera: Child’s gaze directed to camera (which could have been due to an interest in 
the camera or the person behind it).  
Actions in 
the mirror 
kappa  =.77,  
When more than one action occurred in one bout of attention, the coding gave 
precedence to the more apparently ‘sophisticated’ act as sequenced in the categories 
above (i.e., with watching given the least precedence and performing given the most). 
Watching: Child watches the target with no communicative act or intentional 
movement of the body or the mirror.  
Reflecting: Child explores reflections in the mirror e.g., by tilting the mirror or moving 
their own head, or acts mechanically upon the target e.g., moving a car up and down 
the surface of the mirror or pulling a lip in different directions while peering closely. 
Stereotypic actions such as rocking were not included unless they were judged to 
occur specifically in the mirror.  
Social Relating: Child looks at target with a communicative expression or act e.g., a 
smiling look, gesture or utterance or treats the target in the mirror as an audience for a 
performance e.g., reciting a nursery rhyme or showing a skill.  
Affect  
 
Pleasant: Child looks at the target with either a smile or a pleasant expression on the 
face. Kappa = .79, p < .001 
Smile frequency: Smiles were identified at normal playing speed, and included laughs 
as well as slight smiles.  Judgements of smiles were relative to the normal expression 
of the individual child. Durations of smiles are not included in this analysis. 90% 
agreement. 
Coy smiles: Child looks at target with a smile and within the peak of the smile does 
one or more of the following: averts gaze, averts head, cocks head to the side, sticks 
tongue out, brings hand or arm up to cover mouth (all initially identified at normal 
speed).  Following independent coding by two coders, all unclear examples were 
omitted and only coy smiles which both coders agreed upon were included.  
Affect 
change at 
MSR 
100% 
agreement 
No change: On discovering the dot on the face the child touches the face or the dot but 
shows no shift of affective expression from prior to the discovery; the child may show 
stilling and brief ‘frozen’ attention.  
Change of affect: On discovering the dot on the face the child shows a shift of affect 
either becoming more positive or becoming more negative before or after touching the 
face or dot.   
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Results and Discussion 
Due to concerns about homogeneity of variance we used non-parametric statistics for all 
measures: the Kruskal Wallis for group comparisons and the Mann-Whitney U test for pairwise 
comparisons. Given the small sample sizes and the exploratory nature of the study we present exact 
probabilities as being more informative for future research. There were similar numbers of MSR 
recognisers in each group: 8 of the 12 in the autism group, 10 of the 13 in the DS group and 8 of the 
13 in the TD group passed the test. After the primary analyses comparing the groups on the key 
variables (Table 3), the potential effects of MSR status were explored in two ways: i) we repeated all 
the analyses testing group differences on the key variables amongst the matched sub-groups of 
Passers and ii) we compared Passers and Failers within each group on key variables (boxplots in 
Figure 1 show distributions on aattention, social relatedness and pleasant affect to own face). Mean 
durations of bouts are given in seconds, but all other durations are presented as percentages. To aid 
readability in the text below we present variables in italics.  
    TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Interest in own face 
Table 3 shows three indicators of interest in own face: attention to own face, length of mean bout to 
own face and higher mean bouts to own face than to other targets. Amongst the three groups, the 
children with DS showed reliably higher mean bouts to own face and attention to own face than the 
other two groups supporting previous findings of a higher interest in their own face than in typical 
development (Loveland 1987). The children with Autism did not differ from the TD group in 
attention to own face, but they did pay reliably more attention to things than either the TD or DS 
groups. Further, while the children in both the DS and TD groups showed longer mean bouts to their 
own faces than to other targets, this was not the case in the Autism group. Together, these two 
findings suggest that while the children with autism were not inattentive to their own face, their face 
was just another target to attend to. This was not the case for the other two groups.  
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Actions to own face 
The most important difference between the groups lay in what the children did whilst 
watching their own face. The groups did not differ on percentage of Watching, but did differ on 
Reflecting actions and on Social Relating actions, with the Autism group reliably higher in the 
former and lower in the latter. In line with previous findings about social relatedness to others 
(Dawson & Adams, 1984; Hobson & Lee,1998) none of the children with autism displayed to 
themselves the verbal greetings (e.g., saying ‘hello’ and ‘goodbye’), chatting, or performances such 
as reciting a nursery rhyme or bringing an object to show the self in the mirror which some of the 
children in the DS and TD groups did. In general the self was not treated as a social partner by the 
children with autism.  
Affect, smiles and coy smiles 
Similar to the findings regarding mean lengths of bouts, the groups did not differ in pleasant 
affect to other targets, but did in pleasant affect to own face, and in the relative difference between 
pleasant affect to own face versus to other targets. The Autism group was reliably lower in pleasant 
affect to their own face than the DS and TD groups, and more importantly, unlike these two groups, 
showed less pleasant affect towards own face than to other targets. There were no reliable group 
differences in the frequency of smiles (KW (2) 4.00, p = .14). However, there were group differences 
in the frequency of smiles initiated whilst looking at the self (KW (2) 7.54, p = .023). Four children 
in the autism group, 11 in the DS group and 11 in the TD group initiated smiles to self at least once. 
Whilst looking at themselves before the MSR test 6 children in the DS group showed clear coy 
smiles, but.none of the children in the Autism group did (Fisher Exact test p = .0149), consistent with 
previous reports (Neuman &Hill, 1978; Dawson & McKissick, 1984). One child in the TD group 
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showed several clear coy smiles before the MSR test, to herself, to the mother and to the 
camera/person. Only one child (in the DS groups) showed a coy smile following the MSR test. 
MSR and its relation to interest, actions and affect to own face 
The group and pairwise comparisons repeated on the MSR Passers showed one difference 
from the pattern of findings shown in Table 3: there was a reliable group difference in Watching 
(KW (2) 6.42, p = .040) with the TD group higher than the Autism group (U 15.0, p = .072) and the 
DS group (U 12.0, p = .013). Apart from this, the two sets of findings were almost identical and due 
to space limitations will not be repeated here. This similarity suggests that whatever effects the 
absence of self-recognition may have on children’s behaviour in the mirror, after the achievement of 
self-recognition the differences between groups were strong and reliable.  
  FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Two principal findings can be seen in Figure 1. First, there was a high range of variance 
within groups on some variables with overlapping of distributions between groups. Second 
differences between Passers and Failers in each group were small and unreliable in all key variables: 
mean bout duration to other targets, attention to own face, to things, reflecting actions to own face, 
social relating actions to own face and pleasant affect to own face or to other targets. However, 
there were MSR differences on two variables: Failers showed reliably higher percentages of 
Watching own face in the Autism group (U = 3.0, p = .025) and DS group (U = 1.0, p = .018). 
Further, in the Autism group, there were lower mean bout durations to own face in the Failers (U = 
4.0, p = .042).  A watchful focus on the self could be an indicator of imminent self-recognition in 
these two groups, consistent with the finding of a short-term developmental alignment between self 
watching and self-recognition (Nielsen, Dissanayake & Kashima, 2003). Despite their higher 
displays of watching than the other two groups, however, no difference between Passers and Failers 
was evident in the TD children, possibly because of the cross-sectional sampling of the present 
study.  
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Although there was no effect of MSR on pleasant affect to self in any group, the frequency of 
smiles initiated to self tended to be higher amongst Passers in the Autism and DS groups (Autism:U= 
8.0, p = .10; DS: U= 4.5, p = .069). All the 4 children who initiated smiles to self in the Autism 
group were Passers; one in the DS group and 5 in the TD group were Failers. Of the 8 Passers in the 
Autism group none showed any change of affect upon seeing the dot on the face, remaining either 
positive or neutral (one child stilled and stared briefly).  However, 7 of the 10 Passers in the DS 
group showed a distinct change of affect, most becoming less positive. In the TD group there was a 
mixed pattern with 3 showing no change 2 becoming more positive and 3 becoming more negative. 
The absence of negativeness following the perception of the dot on the face in the Autism group is 
intriguing and suggests that their need for environmental order may not extend to their face.  
Language Production: Although the 3 groups were matched on productive language we further 
explored correlations between language and social relating in each group and found different 
patterns of correlation in each group. In both the developmentally delayed groups language ability 
tended to correlate with social relating and pleasant affect to own face, suggestive of a cluster of 
‘communicative’ variables (Autism: rho with social relating actions to self  = .47, p = .13, and with 
pleasant affect to self  = .76, p = .0045; DS: rho with social relating actions to self = .54, p = .054 
and rho with pleasant affect to own face = .74, p = .0038). In the TD group all correlations with 
Language production were low (below .35) and unreliable (probabilities above .20); the absence of a 
similar communicative cluster suggests that in normal development social relations not only predate 
language production, but remain independent of it. Intriguingly, while in the Autism group, language 
production related negatively to attention to things (rho = -.63, p = .027), it correlated positively in 
the DS group (rho = .50, p = .082), a difference which yields a Z score of 2.81, p = .005). 
Gender: There were no gender differences on any of the key variables.  
Implications and Conclusions 
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Autism and social relatedness to the self: Difficulties in interpersonal relatedness in autism appear to 
extend to difficulties in relatedness with the self, supporting arguments about a reciprocal relation 
between a sense of self and a sense of other (Hobson, 1990; Mclaren, 2008). In typical development 
the affordance of the face is almost unavoidably social, with direct gaze attracting attention from 
birth (Farroni, Mansfield, Lai and Johnson, 2003l) and acting as an ostensive signal (Senju & Csibra, 
2008). In autism, perhaps particularly in mirrors where there is no one else to initiate engagement 
and no other social behaviour to highlight interpersonal cues this affordance may be even less potent 
in inviting interaction. Engaging with the self can also provide opportunities for learning about 
expressions and interaction.  Given the enjoyment that typically developing children and children 
with some other developmental disorders derive from such engagement, the loss of this opportunity 
in autism might potentially contribute to further impairments in the development of a sense of self.   
MSR and social relatedness to self 
The strong group differences in social relatedness and positive affect to self and the absence of 
within-group MSR differences suggest that the cognitive skills involved in achieving visual self-
recognition are not responsible for the children’s interest in treating the self as a social partner. On 
the other hand, in the Autism and DS groups recognition did reliably reduce the amount children 
Watched their own face, suggesting that in groups with developmental delay a complex relationship 
may emerge between self-recognition and behaviour to the self. These findings suggest a partial 
dissociation between MSR and affective self-consciousness (Hobson et al, 2006, Izard & Hyson, 
1996; Reddy, 2000). Responses to the interpersonal aspects of oneself appear to be independent of 
MSR in autism, in DS and in TD and are neither, a) necessarily present with visual self-recognition 
nor, b) dependent on visual self-recognition for their emergence. Social relatedness to the self may, 
therefore, offer a sensitive index of the interpersonal quality of the presented self, of how one sees 
the self.  
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